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One of the problems perceived to be at the heart of the global financial crisis was an amalgamation of 
various commercial and investment banking activities under one entity, as well as the interconnectedness 
of the banking entities with other financial institutions, investment funds, and the shadow banking system. 
This paper focuses on various measures that aim to structurally separate the banking entities and their core 
functions from riskier financial activities such as (proprietary) trading or investments in alternative 
investment funds. Although banking structural reforms in the EU, UK, and the US have taken different 
forms, their common denominator is the separation of core banking functions from certain trading or 
securities market activities. Having reviewed the arguments for and against banking structural reforms and 
their varieties in major jurisdictions, including the EU, UK, US, France, and Germany, the paper argues 
that a more nuanced approach to introducing such measures at the EU level is warranted. Given the different 
market structures across the Atlantic and the lack of conclusive evidence on the beneficial impact of banking 
structural reforms, the paper concludes that the withdrawal of the banking structural reforms proposal by 
the European Commission has been a prudent move. It seems that in the absence of concrete evidence, 
experimenting with structural reforms at the Member-State level would be less costly and would provide 
for opportunities for learning from smaller mistakes that could pave the way for a more optimal approach 
to introducing banking structural reforms at the European level in the future.  
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The financial market turmoil of the 2007-2009 triggered a process of financial regulatory reforms the effects 
of which are yet to be fully appreciated. The crisis first began by liquidity problems within the banking 
industry, which was heavily involved in shadow banking activities.1 Although initially several other 
financial institutions were blamed for being culprits in the financial crisis,2 to date, it is well established 
that the banking and shadow banking sectors played an unquestionable role. As the process of legislation 
in itself is a procyclical process, and it often follows the ‘boom–bubble–bust–regulate cycle’,3 the financial 
crisis was followed by a wave of regulatory reforms ushered in to prevent or otherwise preemptively address 
the negative externalities of the next financial crisis. Among such regulatory reforms, banking structural 
reforms stand out both due to the amount of controversy they created and the variety of forms they took 
across the world. 
Together with providing payment services, deposit-taking and granting loans constitute the core banking 
functions, which is also known as commercial banking.4 Although the sources of funding and the methods 
through which commercial banks make loans are varied, such a function remains the core activity of 
commercial banks.5 Over time, banking has expanded from simple core banking functions to universal 
banking.6 Universal banks, which are also known as multifunctional banks,7 megabanks,8 or broad banks,9 
combine commercial banking with other activities, sometimes generally known as investment banking 
activities. Investment banking involves a broad range of activities such as capital market activities, 
including underwriting, corporate financing, advisory services, mergers, acquisitions, loan restructuring, 
                                                     
1 Gary B. Gorton and Andrew Metrick, "Regulating the Shadow Banking System," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity  (2010).; 
Andrei Shleifer, "Comments and Discussions (Regulating the Shadow Banking System by Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick)," ibid.; 
Gary B. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). For a definition 
of shadow banking see Hossein Nabilou and Alessio Pacces, "The Law and Economics of Shadow Banking," in Research 
Handbook on Shadow Banking: Legal and Regulatory Aspects, ed. Iris H. Chiu and Iain G. MacNeil (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Inc., 2018). 
2 Nicolas Papageorgiou and Florent Salmon, "The Role of Hedge Funds in the Banking Crisis: Victim or Culprit," in The Banking 
Crisis Handbook, ed. Greg N. Gregoriou (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010). 
3 John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas for Making It Work Better (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Inc., 2008), 35. 
4 Ross Cranston, Principles of Banking Law, Second ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4.;  
5 Giuliano Iannotta, Investment Banking: A Guide to Underwriting and Advisory Services (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), 1-2. See 
also Lowell L. Bryan, "Core Banking," McKinsey Quarterly, no. 1 (1991): 62. 
6 Matthew Richardson, Roy C. Smith, and Ingo Walter, "Large Banks and the Volcker Rule," in Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-
Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance, ed. Viral V. Acharya, et al. (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2010). 
7 Ross Cranston, Principles of Banking Law, 20-24. 
8 Emilios Avgouleas, "Large Systemic Banks and Fractional Reserve Banking: Intractable Dilemmas in Search of Effective 
Solutions," in Reconceptualising Global Finance and Its Regulation, ed. Ross P. Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas, and Douglas W. 
Arner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 282. 
9 James R. Barth, R. Dan Brumbaugh, and James A. Wilcox, "The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of Broad Banking," 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 2 (2000). 
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proprietary trading, dealership, brokerage, market-making services, and offering derivative products and 
asset management services.10 
The core banking functions involve maturity, liquidity and credit transformation.11 In addition, banks 
provide liquidity to the real economy by providing firms with liquid loans (credit).12 These functions give 
rise to maturity and liquidity mismatches, which are often at the heart of banking crises. Basically, what 
makes banks systemically important - the disruption of which would disrupt the real economy - is their role 
in credit intermediation, which entails both liquidity and maturity transformation. In addition, since 
accepting deposits is intricately linked to the provision of transaction accounts to customers (checking and 
savings accounts), the payment system has often been connected to the liquidity and maturity 
transformation functions. In other words, any disruption in the maturity and liquidity transformation is 
highly likely to cause payment system disruptions that are likely to have broader systemic implications for 
the wider economy. 
In contrast, the non-core banking functions (investment banking activities) are by nature opaque and 
oftentimes speculative, which make their monitoring and supervision rather challenging. Furthermore, they 
are not often essential to performing the core banking functions. Undertaking such non-core banking 
activities by banks elongates the intermediation chains between the lenders and the borrowers which in turn 
results in increased interconnectivity and counterparty risk within the banking industry.13 The policy 
objective from banking structural reforms is to protect the systemically important core banking functions 
from the risks originating from the more speculative but non-systemic investment banking activities. 
Therefore, at the core of the debate on banking structural reforms lies the old controversy over separating 
commercial banking from investment banking. Traditionally, the US has followed a separationist approach 
to the banking industry, i.e., the investment banking was separate from the commercial banking business. 
However, the situation in the EU was almost completely different. European banks mainly followed the 
German-style universal banking model14 in which one entity could undertake both investment and 
                                                     
10 Ross Cranston, Principles of Banking Law, 4. 
11 Zoltan Pozsar et al., "Shadow Banking," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 19, no. 2 (2013). Maturity 
and liquidity transformation is often conducted through taking on-demand liquid deposits and transforming them to long-term 
relatively illiquid loans. As the firms in the real economy normally need to have long-term investment horizons, they often need to 
hold longer-term liabilities than their assets, the provision of long-term loans to firms by the banking industry presents immense 
benefits to society. However, doing so, banks end up holding short-term liabilities and long-term assets on their balance sheet. 
12 By purchasing illiquid assets and accepting illiquid securities as collateral and providing liquid loans, banks play an important 
role in providing firms with the needed liquidity. However, in the process, again, banks end up holding illiquid assets and liquid 
liabilities on their balance sheets, again putting them at risk of illiquidity crisis and potential bank runs. 
13 Erkki Liikanen, "High-Level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the Eu Banking Sector: Final Report," (Brussels2012), 
12-14.; Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin, "The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and the Financial Crisis of 2007–
2009," Annual Review of Economics 2 (2010). 
14 Charles Calomiris, "The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking: American Finance in the German Mirror, 1870-1914," in 
Coordination and Information: Historical Perspectives on the Organization of Enterprise, ed. Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Daniel 
M. G. Raff (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
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commercial banking functions.  
Given the novelty of the idea of the banking structural reforms in its current shape, the academic literature 
on this subject is rather scant. This paper attempts to narrow this gap. This paper proceeds as follows. First, 
it introduces the concept of structural regulation, puts the banking structural reforms into the broader 
concept of structural regulation and discusses its necessity within the banking context. Second, it explores 
the arguments in favor and against the banking structural reforms. Third, it presents an overview of the 
banking structural reforms in the US, EU, UK, France, and Germany. Fourth, it discusses the potential costs 
and unintended consequences of such reforms. Finally, the paper closes with concluding remarks. 
Why structural regulation for banking? 
The literature on financial regulation includes various measures for addressing the risks of financial 
institutions. From among these measures, three overarching approaches to reducing the externalities 
emanating from the financial institutions stand out. The first set of these measures include price-based 
regulations such as emission taxes in environmental regulation and capital or liquidity requirements in 
banking regulation. These regulations are normally introduced in tandem with enhanced and effective 
supervisory and resolution mechanisms. Such measures can also be combined with the structural limits on 
the size and scope of the activities of financial institutions.15 Price-based regulations for addressing systemic 
risk may include the enhanced regulatory framework in the form of higher quantity and quality of loss-
absorbing capital and stricter liquidity standards.16 Second, quantity-based regulation such as emission 
quotas in environmental regulation.17 In the banking industry, concentration limits, the regulations 
encouraging the allocation of certain ratios of loans to underprivileged segments of the society or 
regulations requiring gender balance on boards oftentimes take this form. Third, structural regulations are 
often imposed on the size, structure or scope of activities of financial institutions.18 Its scope includes 
separating and moving risky and complex businesses to stand-alone subsidiaries and prohibiting banks from 
engaging in certain business activities. 
The assumption behind structural reforms is that the price-based or quantity-based regulations do not 
sufficiently address issues in some areas of financial regulation such as capital requirements and leverage 
ratios. In certain other areas such as bail-in requirements, net stable funding ratio (NSFR) and cross-border 
                                                     
15 José Viñals et al., Creating a Safer Financial System: Will the Volcker, Vickers, and Liikanen Structural Measures Help?, Imf 
Staff Discussion Note (International Monetary Fund, 2013), 5-6. 
16 Other examples of price-based regulation may include proactive and intense supervision, effective resolution framework 
including effective burden sharing, and cross border arrangements and enhanced transparency and disclosure. 
17 Martin L. Weitzman, "Prices Vs. Quantities," The Review of Economic Studies 41, no. 4 (1974). 
18 José Viñals et al., Creating a Safer Financial System: Will the Volcker, Vickers, and Liikanen Structural Measures Help?, 5. 
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resolution frameworks, the laws may not be implemented in a consistent manner.19 Overall, there are two 
main arguments for structural measures as opposed to price-based or quantity-based regulations. 
1. It is not clear how robust price-based regulations are and whether they would mitigate tail 
risks. 
It appears that structural reforms in the form of activity restrictions can be helpful in managing the risks 
that cannot be measured and be addressed by price-based regulatory tools.20 There are already capital 
requirements, assessment frameworks for counterparty and market risks, leverage ratio, liquidity standards 
for short-term as well as long-term funding, however, organizational complexity would hinder these price-
based regulations in reducing risks, for example, by opening up venues for regulatory arbitrage. Within 
complex corporate structures, to limit the activities deemed to carry greater and difficult-to-measure risks, 
structural reforms can push such activities out of the corporate structure of a firm altogether.21  
2. There would be prohibitive enforcement costs if the price-based or quantity-based regulations 
are not incentive compatible. 
In contrast to other modalities of regulation, which rely on the rational human reasoning, structural 
regulation (the variations of which are also known as code-based, architecture-based regulation, design-
based regulation or techno-regulation) seeks to “eliminate undesirable behaviour by designing out the 
possibility for its occurrence.”22 This instrument seeks to eliminate the possibility of non-compliance by 
eliminating the possibility for the application of human discretion and practical reasoning in its entirety.23 
For example, it is generically submitted that there is a higher risk of regulatory arbitrage and discrepancies 
in the implementation of the price-based prudential standards that render them virtually ineffective. To be 
more concrete, capital requirements are price-based regulation, however, as it is well-known, capital 
                                                     
19 UK Independent Commission on Banking, "Final Report: Recommendations," (LondonSeptember 2011).; See also José Viñals 
et al., Creating a Safer Financial System: Will the Volcker, Vickers, and Liikanen Structural Measures Help?, 5-6. 
20 José Viñals et al., Creating a Safer Financial System: Will the Volcker, Vickers, and Liikanen Structural Measures Help?, 12. 
21 Ibid., 7-11. 
22 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Texts and Materials (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 102. 
23 Ibid. Although some proponents of the design-based regulation argue that it has the promise of one hundred percent effectiveness, 
(see e.g.,: Lawrence Lessig, "The Zones of Cyberspace," Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 1408.) Karen Yeung identifies reasons 
that these mechanisms can fail. Particularly, she argues that “[t]hose which operate by promoting behavioural change, or seek to 
change the impact of existing behaviour, are more vulnerable to failure than those which do not. And those which override 
individual behaviour are the most effective of all.” See Karen Yeung, "Towards an Understanding of Regulation by Design," in 
Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes, ed. Roger Brownsword and Karen Yeung 
(Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2008), 80 & 106. 
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arbitrage has made them ineffective.24 For example, by booking securitized assets and illiquid securities as 
trading assets and using internal risk models, banks managed to ascribe lower levels of capital to such 
exposures. In this context, if regulations are not incentive compatible, their enforcement would entail 
heavier costs because more resources should be allocated to the supervision and enforcement of such rules. 
In particular, there is a considerable risk in compliance, especially in cross-border supervision and 
resolution context. Like other regulatory instruments, structural measures can best be used where there is a 
high cost of enforcement, which is certain, but lower probability of success of other price-based techniques. 
In contrast, price-based regulation may be used where costs of enforcement are lower, but there is a higher 
probability of success because they are incentive compatible. 
There are various other rationales for introducing banking structural reforms. The proponents of such 
reforms put the following arguments forward for introducing such measures. The rest of this paper only 
discusses and cast a shadow of doubt on the arguments in favor of banking structural reforms that posit that 
they would mitigate systemic risk, prevent cross-subsidization and moral hazard, mitigate conflicts of 
interest, contribute to resolvability, and improve risk management. After reviewing the banking structural 
measures across the Atlantic, the paper will also highlight their potential costs. 
Mitigating systemic risk and insulating banks from trading risks 
One of the main objectives of banking structural reforms is to mitigate the systemic risk and to enhance 
financial stability by closing the contagion channels via insulating banks from trading risks. Contagion, 
which lies at the heart of the definition of systemic risk, refers to “the mechanisms through which shocks 
propagate from one element of the financial system to another and from the financial system to the real 
economy.”25 The main concern about mixing trading activities with core banking activities is that if a 
banking entity incurs losses in its trading activities, it might cause the failure of the entire bank that would 
impair the core banking functions. In turn, the damage to the core banking functions would affect the real 
economy, and as noted earlier, the impact on the real economy lies at the heart of the definition of systemic 
risk. Closing contagion channels can be achieved through insulating core banking functions - the disruption 
of which can negatively affect the real sector of the economy by depriving it of credit - from other functions 
of banking entities such as investment banking and trading activities. Banking structural reforms achieve 
this goal by mitigating the risks of cross-contamination of investment and commercial banking through the 
                                                     
24 David Jones, "Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and Related 
Issues," Journal of Banking & Finance 24, no. 1–2 (2000).; Viral V. Acharya and Sascha Steffen, "The “Greatest” 
Carry Trade Ever? Understanding Eurozone Bank Risks," Journal of Financial Economics 115, no. 2 (2015). 
25 Miquel Dijkman, "A Framework for Assessing Systemic Risk," The World Bank Open Knowledge Repository  (2010): 5-8. For 
an estimation of the costs of the crisis on the real sector, see Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, "Systemic Banking Crises Database: 
An Update,"  (2012). 
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prohibition of mixed funding and separating the capital allocated to the two fundamentally different banking 
functions.26 
As the core banking functions are deemed systemically important, they should not be exposed to the risks 
of the activities that are not systemically important but are more speculative and riskier and could pose risks 
to the core banking functions. Such a risk to the core banking functions would be realized in several 
fashions. For example, the losses from trading and other activities might put the solvency of the bank at 
risk. Otherwise, the bank’s managers may use non-traditional activities to benefit themselves while putting 
the solvency of the bank at risk. In this sense, investment banking activities may be used to loot the bank 
as the losses may be caused by the underpricing of the bank’s services to the managers, who happen to own 
or operate nontraditional services.27 In addition, it is alleged that mixing relationship banking (mainly retail 
or commercial banking) and transaction-based banking (mainly investment banking) brings about a cultural 
shift towards greater leverage and larger balance sheets, which only deteriorates the Too-Big-To-Fail 
problem.28 
Structural measures can also reduce the interconnectedness of banks and shadow banks,29 particularly by 
limiting the exposure of the banking system to the Alternative Investment Fund (AIF) industry. Non-banks’ 
potential role in credit intermediation can make banks, who have substantial relationships with them, fragile 
in case of any shocks to the system. For example, Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) engaged in 
maturity transformation also helped traditional banking entities to conceal the risks of off-balance-sheet 
items.30 The structural measures attempt to close the channels of contagion through which the risks of 
shadow banks might propagate to the banking system. The lack of transparency and insufficient disclosure, 
agency problems in the securitization process, regulatory arbitrage, and high levels of leverage in the 
shadow banking sector would also be among the factors that could justify establishing structural regulation 
between the banking and shadow banking system.31 In this sense, some fragmentations, which may result 
from the banking structural reforms, may be the intended consequence of the reforms as it may result in 
reducing the interconnectedness between banks and non-bank financial intermediaries.32 
                                                     
26 Financial Stability Board, "Structural Banking Reforms: Cross-Border Consistencies and Global Financial Stability 
Implications," (2014), 3. 
27 Bernard Shull and Lawrence J White, "The Right Corporate Structure for Expanded Bank Activities," Banking LJ 115 (1998): 
464-67. 
28 Financial Stability Board, "Structural Banking Reforms: Cross-Border Consistencies and Global Financial Stability 
Implications," 3. 
29 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) that reduce banks’ capacity to engage in maturity 
transformation are two mechanisms introduced by the Basel III. 
30 Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (2009), 20. 
31 See European Repo Council, Shadow Banking and Repo (2012). 




Cross-subsidization and moral hazard 
Another reason for separating core banking from non-core banking entities is that non-core banking 
activities have risks that should not be performed by a government-guaranteed institution. In other words, 
it is not justifiable to let the financial institutions invest on their own accounts while funding their activities 
at below-market rates coming from the government explicit and implicit guarantees.33 Instead, non-core 
banking activities should be performed by separately capitalized subsidiaries within a holding company 
structure.34 However, this argument is built on the assumption that banks actually are subsidized by 
governments and that the regulator wants to limit the benefits of public guarantees to the systemically 
important parts of the financial sector (core banking functions).35 
To say the least, the literature on the cross-subsidization is inconclusive. Some studies suggest that there 
are substantial implicit and explicit subsides within current schemes of government guarantees offered to 
banks36 due to the inherently fragile banking business model and its susceptibility to bank runs,37 and that 
banks may cross-subsidize trading and private funds using the subsidized funds. These subsidies include 
explicit guarantees such as deposit insurance schemes38 and privileged access to the Lender of Last Resort 
(LOLR) facilities.39 Although the controversy over the contribution of deposit insurance to financial 
stability is far from settled,40 it is generally accepted that it has prevented bank runs since their establishment 
in major jurisdictions. However, deposit insurance may give rise to certain perverse incentives in the 
banking industry. In addition, implicit guarantees for banks are mainly in the form of bailouts for TBTF or 
too-interconnected-to-fail banks, which again would amplify moral hazard.41  
                                                     
33 This argument equally applies to other financial institutions having access to government subsides such as government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs) (e.g., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the US) and implicitly guaranteed enterprises such as those perceived to 
be too-big-to-fail. See Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson, "Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act," Annual Review of 
Financial Economics 4, no. 1 (2012): 15. 
34 Lowell L. Bryan, "Core Banking," 62. 
35 José Viñals et al., Creating a Safer Financial System: Will the Volcker, Vickers, and Liikanen Structural Measures Help?, 5-6. 
36 Bryan T. Kelly, Hanno Lustig, and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, "Too-Systemic-to-Fail: What Option Markets Imply About Sector-
Wide Government Guarantees," NBER Working Paper Series, No. 17149  (2011). 
37 Nadezhda Malysheva and John R. Walter, "How Large Has the Federal Financial Safety Net Become?," Economic Quarterly - 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 96, no. 3 (2010). 
38 Although banks often pay risk-based premiums for the deposit insurance, charging risk-adjusted deposit insurance premium has 
been dauntingly difficult. See Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Edward J. Kane, "Deposit Insurance around the Globe: Where Does It 
Work?," Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 2 (2002).; Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Edward Kane, and Luc Laeven, "Deposit 
Insurance around the World: A Comprehensive Analysis and Database," Journal of Financial Stability 20 (2015).; Deniz Anginer, 
Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Min Zhu, "How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the Recent Crisis," Journal 
of Banking & Finance 48 (2014). Since taxpayers are the ultimate backstop of the deposit insurance schemes, limiting this cross 
subsidization is one of the main objectives of the structural reforms. 
39 For the concept of the LOLR, see Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (London: H.S. King, 
1873).; Xavier Freixas et al., "Lender of Last Resort: What Have We Learned since Bagehot?," Journal of Financial Services 
Research 18, no. 1 (2000).; Charles W. Calomiris, Marc Flandreau, and Luc Laeven, "Political Foundations of the Lender of Last 
Resort: A Global Historical Narrative," Journal of Financial Intermediation 28 (2016). 
40 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Edward J. Kane, "Deposit Insurance around the Globe: Where Does It Work?."; Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Edward Kane, and Luc Laeven, "Deposit Insurance around the World: A Comprehensive Analysis and Database." 
41 Charles W. Calomiris, "Building an Incentive-Compatible Safety Net," Journal of Banking & Finance 23, no. 10 (1999). 
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The above-mentioned subsidies constitute the gross subsidy. However, regulatory costs (such as the costs 
of the risk-adjusted deposit insurance premia, maintaining reserves at the central bank and other regulatory 
costs) should be subtracted from those subsidies. Some authors estimate that the amount of subsidies net of 
regulatory costs to the US banking system is either negative or close to zero.42 Others find that the amount 
of the subsidy to the banks is not substantial. Recent bank reactions to TBTF designations show that no 
longer is there any subsidy for big banks, even perhaps there is some negative subsidies.43 However, such 
estimates are dependent upon certain assumptions on the level of regulatory capital, the variance of the 
bank’s investments and the level of potential losses to the deposit insurance fund and whether other 
elements are included in the subsidies and costs. Mainly absent in those studies are the expectation of 
bailouts for large banking groups.44 If such costs would be included in the gross subsidy figure, it would be 
hard to argue that there are no subsidies for the banking industry in general.45 
There are two main problems with cross-subsidization in comingling the core and non-core banking 
activities within a single banking entity. Such problems have both distributional and welfare effects. 
Distributional effects arise if those subsidies are allowed to flow to the non-core activities, the bank will 
have an advantage over its competitors in the operation of its non-core activities. Moreover, those subsidies 
will incentivize banks to overproduce the non-core services which could have welfare effects in the long 
run.46 
Subsidizing banks often lead to excessive risk-taking by TBTF or too-interconnected–to-fail banks;47 hence 
the name too-big-to-fail subsidy. The potential flow of the taxpayer-subsidized funds to private funds in the 
form of implicit guarantees or provision of emergency liquidity by their parent banks can incent them to 
engage in opportunistic behavior, i.e., taking excessive risks at the expense of their parent banks. Their 
parent banks, in turn, would shift some of their losses to the taxpayers rather than themselves incurring 
them.48 This has been evidenced in the bailouts of hedge funds by their parent companies (banking entities) 
in the recent GFC. For example, Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, and Citigroup bailed out their internal hedge 
                                                     
42 Bernard Shull and Lawrence J White, "The Right Corporate Structure for Expanded Bank Activities," 464-67. One important 
question is that whether the expansion of a bank to new untraditional activities generate new subsidies or costs for the bank 
(marginal net subsidy). Ibid. 
43 Alan S. Blinder, After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response, and the Work Ahead (New York: Penguin, 2013), 
chapter 11. 
44 Bernard Shull and Lawrence J White, "The Right Corporate Structure for Expanded Bank Activities," 464-67. 
45 Anat R. Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do About It (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013).;  
46 Bernard Shull and Lawrence J White, "The Right Corporate Structure for Expanded Bank Activities," 464-65. 
47 Anthony Saunders, "Banking and Commerce: An Overview of the Public Policy Issues," Journal of banking & finance 18, no. 2 
(1994). 
48 For a detailed overview of how the failure of Bear Stearns hedge funds affected the firm, See William D Cohan, House of Cards: 
A Tale of Hubris and Wretched Excess on Wall Street (Anchor, 2010). See also Jason Hsu and Max Moroz, "Shadow Banks and 




funds just before their collapse.49 At least in case of systemically important Bear Stearns, these bailouts 
indirectly contributed to its collapse.50 In that case, although the collapse of hedge funds did not impose 
substantial credit risks on Bear Stearns, it bailed the hedge funds out due to reputational concerns that the 
failure of such entities could raise concerns about the safety and soundness of the firm itself. 
Mitigating conflicts of interest in universal banking 
Most of the arguments for conflicts of interest raised in favor of recent banking structural reforms have 
their roots in the policy debates preceding the introduction of the Glass-Steagall Act.51 It is argued that 
universal banking provides for opportunities for conflicts of interest. In the context of commercial vs. 
investment banking, conflicts of interest primarily lie in the different roles of commercial and investment 
banks. Commercial banking traditionally involves taking deposits and granting loans, while investment 
banks and securities dealers’ functions include, inter alia, underwriting, selling, trading, and distributing 
securities. Therefore, a bank acting as both a customer’s agent and a dealer on the same transaction 
inevitably faces conflicts of interest. For instance, an investment bank within a universal banking model 
that underwrites initial public offerings (IPOs) might ill-advisedly suggest clients and customers 
(depositors) to buy low-quality and less-promising securities.52 To mitigate such conflicts of interest, the 
Glass-Steagall Act prohibited commercial banks from underwriting securities altogether by separating 
commercial banks from investment banks.53  
There are several reasons for the conflicts of interest in the debate on universal banking.54  
First: Commercial banks have a comparative advantage in constructing debt contracts and monitoring the 
borrowers.55 There is economies of scale and comparative cost advantages in information production for 
                                                     
49 Darrell Duffie, "The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks," The Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, no. 1 (2010): 59. 
50 William D Cohan, House of Cards: A Tale of Hubris and Wretched Excess on Wall Street. 
51 Michael Perino, The Hellhound of Wall Street: How Ferdinand Pecora's Investigation of the Great Crash Forever 
Changed American Finance (New York: The Penguin Press, 2010). 
52 One of the main cases of conflicts of interest in banks exists between its different departments or divisions. The problem was 
that the research departments of investment banks were financed by the profits of the investment-banking units. Such a situation 
gave rise to conflicts of interest between banks’ analysts and their investment-banking division because, within such a framwwork, 
the banks’ analysts might tend to (or be pressured to) recommend securities that its investment banking unit underwrites. In the 
end, discoveries of such conflicts of interest led to a separation of research and investment banking division into two different 
subsidiaries, or to establishing Chinese walls between research and corporate finance divisions within investment banks. See 
Shelagh Heffernan, Modern Banking (Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2005), 19-23. 
53 The Glass-Steagall Act also contained exceptions. For example, commercial banks were allowed to underwrite municipal bonds, 
US government bonds, and engage in private placements. 
54 Georg J. Benston, The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking: The Glass-Steagall Act Revisited and Reconsidered 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1990), 205-06.; Anthony Saunders, "Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: The Problem 
of Conflicts of Interest," Business Review  (July/August 1985). 
55 Douglas W Diamond, "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies 51, no. 3 (1984).; 
Ram TS Ramakrishnan and Anjan V Thakor, "Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation," ibid.; Eugene F. 
Fama, "What's Different About Banks?," Journal of Monetary Economics 15, no. 1 (1985).; Paige Fields, Donald Fraser, and Rahul 
Bhargava, "A Comparison of Underwriting Costs of Initial Public Offerings by Investment and Commercial Banks," Journal of 
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commercial banks that make them more efficient in undertaking better debt monitoring.56 In other words, 
banks are information brokers and can improve social welfare by reducing the costs associated with 
information asymmetry and moral hazard.57 In addition, commercial banking provides banks with access 
to substantial amounts of nonpublic information about the financial conditions of the borrower. This is 
especially significant in commercial banks that engage in relationship lending. This informational 
advantage might give rise to conflicts of interest.58 If commercial and investment banking activities 
comingle, as is the case in universal banks, the proprietary trading desks of those banks will be well 
positioned to engage in opportunistic behavior and exploit non-public information at the expense of 
customers of the bank.  
Second: The conflicts of interest that exist between investment banker’s role in promoting securities issues 
and the commercial bankers’ obligation to provide disinterested and neutral advice. This concern about 
conflicts of interest lies within the investment banking business itself. For example, investment banking 
units of banking entities or groups offer advisory services to corporate customers on financing, mergers and 
acquisitions, and many other different issues about firms. Such a role in the financial markets gives them 
privileged access to a substantial amount of non-public information.59 Indeed, if the Chinese walls between 
advising units of universal banks and their trading desks are permeable, the information leaked from the 
advisory and lending units of banks to trading desks could be used by the traders of the bank to profit from 
such non-public information, potentially at the expense of customers. 
Third: Commercial banks might be tempted to make loans to support the price of a security, which is 
underwritten by the bank’s securities affiliate. Specifically, the Glass-Steagall Act was intended to address 
the conflicts of interest embedded in financing companies by financial intermediaries and those offering 
securities to investors.60 Although some scholars cast doubt on this situation as a serious case of conflicts 
of interest,61 the main concern was that commercial banks, being the main lenders to companies and having 
good knowledge of their financial situation, would sell risky and about-to-default securities to 
unsophisticated investors.62  
                                                     
Financial Research 26, no. 4 (2003). 
56 Douglas W Diamond, "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring." 
57 Ram TS Ramakrishnan and Anjan V Thakor, "Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation." 
58 Georg J. Benston, The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking: The Glass-Steagall Act Revisited and Reconsidered, 
205-06.; Anthony Saunders, "Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: The Problem of Conflicts of Interest." 
59 Ingo Walter, "Conflicts of Interest and Market Discipline among Financial Service Firms," European Management Journal 22, 
no. 4 (2004). 
60 Amar Gande, "Commercial Banks in Investment Banking," in Handbook of Financial Intermediation and Banking, ed. Anjan 
V.; Boot Thakor, Arnoud W.A. (Elsevier, 2008). (Providing an overview of potential conflicts of interest in the universal banking 
model and discussing whether they are of concern for regulators.) 
61 Randall S. Kroszner and Raghuram G. Rajan, "Is the Glass–Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal 
Banking before 1933," American Economic Review 84, no. 4 (1994). 
62 Luigi Zingales, "The Future of Securities Regulation," Journal of Accounting Research 47, no. 2 (2009): 415-16. 
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Fourth: The potential conflicts in using the securities affiliate or department of a bank to underwrite new 
securities in order to repay the unprofitable loans or non-performing loans made by the same commercial 
bank.63 By underwriting securities that the commercial bank itself is knowledgeable of its questionable 
value, the commercial bank can benefit from such underwriting by requiring the firm to use the proceeds 
from the issue to pay off the loan. In so doing, the commercial bank serves itself at the expense of outside 
investors in the newly issued securities.64  
Fifth: Commercial banks may also be tempted to extract monopoly rents from the information accumulated 
over the life of the lending relationship. Since the existing relationship between costumers and the 
commercial banks (lending relationship) creates information about the borrower to which only the lending 
institution has access, the commercial bank can exclude other underwriters because of its informational 
advantage.65 Outside firms trying to compete with the commercial bank that does the underwriting and has 
an ongoing lending relationship with the firm that is going public, may face a winner’s curse problem.66 An 
additional source of conflicts of interest regarding informational advantage concerns the existence of lock-
in effects. Commercial banks may lock in their clients over the long-term and extract profits from their 
relationship because they would have information monopoly originating from the private information 
generated in the loan monitoring process. 
Additional conflicts of interests may arise if the commercial department of the universal bank may have the 
tendency to place the unsold securities of the issue in the trust account of the bank, which is a source of 
revenue for the bank. Commercial banks might also be tempted to make loans imprudently to issuers of 
securities underwritten by the bank or its securities affiliates. Direct lending by the bank to its securities 
affiliate is a source of additional conflicts of interest. Finally, if a banking entity incurs losses in proprietary 
trading, it might tend to cover those losses at the expense of clients’ interests.  
Last but not least, proprietary trading and the activities related to hedge funds involve complex financial 
products and transactions, such as highly illiquid and hard-to-value structured products.67 This inherent 
complexity further increases the information asymmetry between market participants, mainly between 
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66 Steven A. Sharpe, "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer 
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67 Financial Stability Oversight Council, "Study & Recommendations on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading & Certain 
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13 
 
originators and investors of the structured products. Increased information asymmetry breeds opportunistic 
behavior and amplifies the concerns for aggravated conflicts of interest.68 Overall, it seems that in an 
imperfect information setting, the broader the range of a financial firm’s activities, the greater the likelihood 
of conflicts of interest.69 
Although there are private-law mechanisms to reduce the conflicts of interest in universal banking, they are 
generally perceived to be inadequate in addressing such concerns.70 For example, in the US, three categories 
of laws impose a restriction on banking entities with the aim of reducing conflicts of interest in their dealings 
with their customers. Such provisions include the fiduciaries’ duty of loyalty under State laws, the 
investment advisers’ and commodity trading advisers’ duty of loyalty under federal and state securities and 
commodities laws, and the duty of loyalty attached to benefit plans under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA). And finally, there is a prohibition under the securities laws on obtaining an 
advantage by using nonpublic information about a customer or an issuer, such as laws prohibiting insider 
trading. Similar provisions exist in the EU, both at the Member-State level and the EU level. In addition, 
banks have voluntarily erected walls between ‘customer-serving activities’ (departments engaging in 
dealing with depositors and extending loans) and other departments (such as proprietary trading desks and 
department dealing in securities and mergers and acquisitions and investment banking in general) to prevent 
information flows.  
Despite the market forces and private-law mechanisms, it is argued that within 2 years after the passage of 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in the US, major commercial banks that took full advantage of this Act to 
engage in all other non-core banking activates ended up involving in serious corporate financial scandals, 
including Enron and WorldCom. Nearly all of the investment banking units of the Bank Holding Companies 
(BHCs) involved in the violations such as corrupted equity research, facilitating late trading, and market 
timing by hedge funds at the expense of the ordinary shareholders of in-house mutual funds, and playing 
the role of principal and intermediary in corporate actions.71  
In spite of such anecdotal evidence, the conflict between anecdotal evidence and empirical findings is 
rampant in the banking structural reforms literature. Even from its early days, controversies arose about the 
overall costs and benefits of the Glass-Steagall Act and many commentators questioned its underlying 
rationale. Empirical research found that universal banking does not give rise to serious abuses of conflicts 
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Solutions," 294. 
70 See Financial Stability Oversight Council, "Study & Recommendations on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading & Certain 
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of interest.72 Empirical evidence also suggests that universal banks did not engage in opportunistic behavior 
that would originate from such conflicts of interest.73 Indeed, the absence of the abuse of conflicts of interest 
may be due to the private-law solutions to conflicts of interest that apply to both systems, i.e. a system with 
universal banking and a system in which investment banking and commercial banking is separated. For 
example, it was estimated that securities underwritten by the banking entity’s affiliates within the universal 
banks outperformed comparable securities underwritten by independent non-conflicted investment banks. 
What confirms these findings is that the superior performance was mostly attributable to the lower-rated 
and most information-sensitive issues of securities.74 This finding clearly runs counter to the idea that 
combining investment and commercial banking can increase conflicts of interest. 
Based on this finding, Kroszner and Rajan argue that the investor protection argument, which underlies the 
role of conflicts of interest for separating investment activities from core banking activities, is not 
justifiable.75 They further argue that since the public markets and rating agencies were aware of the potential 
conflicts of interest, they imposed a ‘lemons market’ discount on information-sensitive securities 
underwritten by the affiliates of commercial banks. In response, the affiliates of the banking entities turned 
away from underwriting information-sensitive securities and started underwriting securities that were less 
information-sensitive.76 Their finding confirms the idea that the market forces can be effective in limiting 
the propensity of the affiliates of commercial banks to take advantage of uninformed investors and provide 
adequate monitoring mechanisms to reign in such potential conflicts of interest. Nonetheless, structural 
reforms attempt to close any remaining loopholes in the banking entities’ involvement in proprietary trading 
and hedge fund and private equity fund investment.77 
Contribution to resolvability  
It is long acknowledged that the intensity and high level of intra-group exposures can be an impediment to 
the orderly resolution of an insolvent bank. Although such exposures play a beneficial role in risk 
management, they add complexities in the process of resolution by making it difficult to spinoff and sell the 
viable units or restructure the group. As structural measures are aimed at separating the core banking 
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activities, which are essential to the real economy, from the exposure and contagion of distress in the trading 
components of the banking group, they may reduce losses and limit the likelihood of public support for 
credit institutions in the event of their failure. In this way, both components of a multifunctional bank could 
be more easily wound down and the likelihood of bailouts or public guarantees would be substantially 
decreased. Hence, these reforms can provide credibility to the resolution mechanism by ex-ante restricting 
the public guarantees to the core banking businesses. Therefore, structural reforms can enhance market 
discipline by making sure that there is less public support for the failing banks.78 
There are several venues through which banking structural reforms may contribute to the resolvability of 
the banking entities. First, by separating trading entities from core banking functions, structural reforms 
would contribute to the safety and soundness of the bank and would mitigate the likelihood of bank failure 
in the first place. Second, structural reforms can make the ever-increasing complexity of the universal 
banking structures simpler and hence contribute to the faster resolvability of the banking entities and 
reduction of the amount of losses in the event of a failure of a large bank. By separating core banking 
entities from the trading entities, the resolution authority will have a better overall view of the structure of 
the bank and may be made capable of resolving the trading entities of the banking entity while allowing 
and assisting the smooth operation of the core banking activities. Third, the resolvability of a financial 
institution will be enhanced by some firm-specific structural measures imposed by the banking recovery 
and resolution directives and regulations. The mere separation of risky activities of large complex banks 
would contribute to the resolvability of banking groups. 
In addition, if structural measures are required for efficient resolution of banking groups, a tailor-made 
firm-specific recovery and resolution plan can better tackle the problems than the outright across-the-board 
structural measures.79 In this perspective, the EU proposal, which proposed a baseline structural reforms 
for the banks exceeding certain size and activity thresholds, and envisaged the possibility of imposing 
further firm-specific constraints based on the resolvability assessment, which could be imposed through 
recovery and resolution plans, would have been a suitable regulatory approach.80 
Firm-specific structural measures for facilitating efficient and least-cost bank recovery and resolution, 
which are bottom-up approaches to banking structural reform - as opposed to the ex-ante across-the-board 
structural measures - are also supported by the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions.81 These measures may include changes to the scope of 
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business or size or to the corporate structure of the group. Although firm-specific structural measures, which 
fit the risk profile of each individual bank, can reduce complexity and contribute to the better supervision 
of the bank which in turn would reduce the risk of failure and costs of resolution, discrepancies in the cross-
border resolution regimes and existence of legal and political constraints may still favor the across-the-
board structural reforms.82 However, an equivalence regime, which creates the possibility of recognition of 
other jurisdictions’ rules on structural reforms, will allow for reducing the potential cross-border resolution 
problems. 
Approaches to banking structural reforms 
Despite their common objectives and relatively few instruments at regulators’ disposal, banking structural 
reforms across the Atlantic have taken rather divergent paths particularly in terms of scope and strictness. 
First, in terms of scope, the structural measures often differ on where the separation line is to be drawn. In 
other words, there is a considerable difference in the scope of the activities that should be separated from 
the core banking functions. Second, in terms of strictness, there is a significant divergence in how strict, 
thick or tall the wall standing in between separated activities should be.83  
In what follows, for the purposes of comparison, the paper investigates the banking structural reforms in 
main banking jurisdictions of the US, EU, UK, Germany, and France. However, it should be mentioned 
that these jurisdictions are not the only ones to introduce structural reforms for their banking industry. Other 
European Economic Area (EEA) jurisdictions such as Belgium and Switzerland have already established 
such reforms. Other major banking jurisdictions, which account for a substantial amount of banking assets, 
especially those jurisdictions that are home to many Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) have 
introduced such measures or are considering them. However, some EU jurisdictions hosting G-SIBs (such 
as Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden) have not issued structural reform proposals other than the one 
proposed by the European Commission.84 Outside Europe, steps towards banking structural reforms are 
being taken in China and Japan.85 
Overall, there are five main approaches to structural measures for regulating the banking industry.  
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1. Activity restrictions: These constraints may include the restrictions placed on the prohibition of the 
proprietary trading by banks, such as what has been undertaken in the US by the Volcker Rule, 
which is essentially a structural reform that is based on activity restrictions, or what the proponents 
of narrow banking had proposed.86 Such activity restrictions are often accompanied by imposing 
stricter requirements related to capital, intra-group exposure limits, liquidity, and funding sources 
on parts of a banking organization.   
2. Structural separation of certain activities such as ring-fencing of the deposit-taking functions and 
requiring or incenting banks to operate through certain structures (e.g., subsidiaries rather than 
branches),87 and restriction on banking affiliates.  
3. Restrictions on the corporate structure of a banking entity, such as the prohibition on branching, 
which gave rise to the unit-banking phenomenon in the US. 
4. Size limits on the banking entities. 
5. Geographic restrictions on banking entities. 
Many jurisdictions use a combination of these techniques such as the EU proposal which combines 
structural subsidiarization of the core banking entity and the trading entity and imposing activity restrictions 
on those entities. In the US banking history, the combination of geographic restrictions and limitations on 
corporate structures gave rise to banking phenomena such as dual banking, unit banking, branch banking, 
chain banking, etc., the study of which goes beyond the scope of this paper. The modern forms of banking 
structural reforms rely on a combination of activity restrictions and structural separation. 
A review of the basic legal documents on banking structural reforms shows that structural reforms -in their 
current forms - can have at least two major sources. First, laws and regulations that delineate the banking 
powers (activity restrictions), which could include functional separation of different types of financial 
activities by putting outright prohibitions on them. Second, law and regulations that set structural 
restrictions on banking entities, such as ring-fencing and subsidiarization for certain activities that should 
be conducted in a separately capitalized entities within a single holding company structure. In other words, 
these limitations require that the banking entity can engage in certain business activities provided that the 
entity complies with certain structural limitations. Other examples of these limitations are those attempting 
to address conflicts-of-interest concerns by establishing Chinese walls between different departments of a 
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banking entity. The third option would be imposing geographical separation by requiring subsidiarization 
requirement for domestic operation of foreign banks, which also forms part of the structural measures.88 
Activity restrictions: From narrow banking to the Glass-Steagall to the Volcker 
Rule 
In general, within the US context, banks have ‘enumerated’ as well as ‘incidental’ powers. Enumerated 
powers of a bank are those that are enumerated in the statutes and relevant rules and regulations and 
incidental powers are those that are “necessary to carry on the business of banking”.89 In main banking 
jurisdictions, the core banking activities, i.e., accepting deposits and granting credit by a variety of means, 
as well as offering payment services are at the core of enumerated banking powers.90 In addition, there are 
activities that are prohibited for banks in statutes.  
In the US, the powers of banks regarding real property, securities and insurance have been specifically 
addressed in the statutes. Unless otherwise permitted, banks are prohibited from owning and investing in 
real property,91 owning corporate stocks or underwriting corporate securities,92 underwriting insurance,93 
and charging interest above the legal rate.94 Unless there is an incidental power available to a bank, the 
general rule on banking powers is that if statutes and regulations are silent about certain activities, banks 
cannot undertake them.95 The same rule applies equally to banks in Europe, where the Annex I of the CRD 
IV enumerates the banking powers and what lies outside would not be allowed for a banking entity.96  
Perhaps the most intrusive type of structural reforms of the banking industry based on activity restrictions 
have been narrow banking initiatives. Narrow banking proposals intend to strictly limit the types of assets 
that the demandable deposit-taking institution can hold. A narrow bank is defined as “a financial institution 
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that issues demandable liabilities and invests in assets that have little or no nominal interest rate and credit 
risk.”97  
The most radical of all these proposals was the narrow banking proposal for a 100% currency-reserve 
banking, put forward by Henry Simons.98 This means that all deposits of customers of a bank should be 
held at central banks in the form of deposit, which is equivalent to a 100% reserve requirement. In other 
words, the amounts that can be redeemed at any time at par value should have a 100% reserve requirement. 
This proposal is part of the proposals that came to be known as the Chicago Plan in the aftermath of the 
Great Depression.99 At the heart of the narrow banking solutions to the banking crises is the separation of 
banks into two parts: a narrow bank offering deposits and a mutual fund or investment company in which 
all the risks of volatility in the market value of assets pass through to the investors.100 Thus far, narrow 
banking proposals have not been implemented in any major banking jurisdiction.  
The Volcker Rule 
The US Volcker Rule (title VI of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) is a 
two-pronged provision. It introduces restrictions on proprietary trading, as well as prohibitions on the 
investments in and sponsorship of hedge funds by banking entities. The paper first studies the Volcker 
Rule’s prohibition on proprietary trading, then it analyzes the Volcker Rule’ prohibitions on investment in 
and sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity funds by banking entities in light of its stated objectives 
as well as theoretical and empirical findings. 
Prohibitions on proprietary trading  
The proprietary trading provisions of the Volcker Rule prohibit a banking entity101 from engaging in trading 
activities as principal to profit from the near-term price movements.102 A ‘banking entity’ is defined as “any 
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insured depository institution,103 any company that controls an insured depository institution, or that is 
treated as a bank holding company …, and any affiliate or subsidiary104 of any such entity.”105 The term 
‘proprietary trading’ when used with respect to a banking entity or a Systemically Important Non-Bank 
Financial Company (SINBFC) means “engaging as a principal for the trading account106 of [a] banking 
entity or [a SINBFC] in any transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, any security, 
any derivative, any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, any option on any such security, 
derivative, or contract, or any other security or financial instrument that the appropriate Federal banking 
agencies, the [SEC], and the [CFTC] may … determine.”107 
Proprietary trading exceptions (Permitted activities)  
Despite the general ban on proprietary trading, the Volcker Rule accommodates certain exceptions as 
‘permitted activities’.108 These permitted activities mainly involve banking activities perceived to be 
ultimately beneficial to the broader economy and necessary for maintaining the safety and soundness of 
financial institutions.109 These permitted activities under the Volcker Rule include: 
1. market-making related activity; 
2. risk-mitigating hedging; 
3. underwriting; 
4. transactions on behalf of customers; 
5. transacting in government securities; 
6. certain insurance activities; 
7. investments in small business investment companies; 
8. public welfare investments; 
9. certain qualified rehabilitation expenditures under federal or state tax laws; 
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10. certain offshore activities; and  
11. Other activities that Agencies determine would promote and protect the safety and soundness of 
banking entities and the US financial stability.110 
The Volcker Rule provisions as related to hedge and private equity funds prohibit a banking entity from 
investing in or having certain relationships with hedge and private equity funds as defined under the 
exclusions of the Investment Company Act of 1940.111 These restrictions prohibit a banking entity from 
acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsoring a hedge fund or 
a private equity fund.112 However, the Volcker Rule accommodates certain de minimus exception for 
investment in private funds. 
In addition, in the US, banking entities are prohibited from entering into a ‘covered transaction’ as defined 
in Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act.113 A ‘covered transaction’ includes making loans, purchasing 
assets, extending guarantees, etc.114 Therefore, the second condition imposed on the permitted activities of 
banking entities in connecting with investing in hedge funds and private equity funds is that such activities 
should be subject to the requirements of section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act which imposes strict 
qualitative and quantitative restrictions on ‘covered transactions’ between a banking entity and an affiliate. 
In addition, section 23B imposes an ‘arm’s length’ requirement on the terms of any transaction between a 
banking entity that organizes or offers or sponsors a hedge or private equity fund or acts as their investment 
manager or adviser to those funds. The arm’s length requirement means that these transactions should be 
concluded on market terms and conditions. Therefore, virtually none of the financial transactions between 
an insured depository institution and an affiliate should be more favorable than market terms. Such 
restrictions are particularly effective in reducing the likelihood of conflicts of interest and transfer of the 
benefits of banks’ deposit insurance and safety net from insured depository institutions to hedge funds.115 
Furthermore, in the US, the Fed’s enhanced prudential standards final rule requires foreign banking 
organizations with $50 billion or more in US non-branch or agency assets (foreign banks “to place virtually 
all of its US subsidiaries underneath a top-tier US intermediate holding company (IHC).”116 This rule is 
also known as the Intermediate Holding Company (IHC) rule.117 
                                                     
110 Ibid.                                                                                                                                                                              
111 The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. 
112 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(B). 
113 12 U.S.C. § 1851(f). 
114 12 C.F.R. 223.3(h) (also known as Regulation W). 
115 Financial Stability Oversight Council, "Study & Recommendations on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading & Certain 
Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds," 67-68. See also José Viñals et al., Creating a Safer Financial System: 
Will the Volcker, Vickers, and Liikanen Structural Measures Help?, 14-16. 
116 12 CFR § 252 – Enhanced prudential standards (Regulation YY) (adopted February 18, 2014) 
117 More recently, the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 was repeal the restrictions of the Volcker Rule, howerver as of this wrting, 




The EU (subsidiarization) 
In November 2011, a High-Level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector chaired 
by Erkki Liikanen was set up by the EU Internal Markets Commissioner Michael Barnier. The mission of 
the group was to assess whether additional reforms targeting the structure of the banking entities would 
reduce the likelihood and the impact of bank failures, would ensure the smooth continuation of vital 
economic functions, and would better protect retail clients. The Group presented its findings on October 2, 
2012, in a report that came to be known as ‘the Liikanen Report’.118 Based on the findings of this report, a 
proposal on the banking structural measures improving the resilience of the EU credit institutions was 
published on January 29, 2014, which is also known as ‘the Barnier Proposal’.119 The EU proposal on 
banking structural reforms, which is viewed as the equivalent of the US Volcker Rule, laid down rules 
aimed at imposing structural changes on TBTF banks by setting restrictions on proprietary trading120 by 
banks and requiring the separation of their commercial banking activities from their proprietary trading 
activities.121 It is apt to mention that this proposal was withdrawn by the European Commission in 2018, 
however, the unique approach that it takes to the structural reforms as well as the likelihood of resurgence 
of interests in structural reforms, either in a standalone form or as part of the recovery and resolution plans, 
makes it a worthwhile piece of regulatory proposal to review in this section.  
The draft proposal of the EC consisted of a ban on proprietary trading and potential separation of certain 
trading activities from the deposit-taking entity.122 This separation would have imposed the requirement 
that the deposit-taking entity would be fully distinct from other entities in legal, economic, governance and 
operational terms. Indeed, the EU proposal was mainly concerned with shielding the core banking functions 
from the risk of contagion. This goal was pursued by requiring subsidiarization of some activities and 
restricting the intra-group exposures within multifunctional banks or conglomerates.123 The number of 
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banking entities subject to the EU proposal would have been limited. Unlike the US Volcker Rule, which 
applies to all banking entities, the EU proposal would have been applicable to only the large EU banks 
considered to be systemically important.124 
Entities subject to this regulation would have been prohibited from engaging in proprietary trading, and 
from acquiring or retaining units or shares of AIFs, and from investing in derivatives, certificates, indices 
or any other financial instrument whose performance is linked to shares or units of AIFs, and from holding 
any units or shares in an entity that engages in proprietary trading or acquires units or shares in AIFs with 
their own capital or borrowed money and for the sole purpose of making a profit for their own account.125 
Financial instruments issued by Member States central governments or by entities such as the multilateral 
development banks including the European Investment Bank and European Investment Fund as listed in 
point (2) of Article 117 of CRR and International organizations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) as listed in Article 118 of the CRR were exempt 
from the ban on proprietary trading and from the structural separation requirement.126 The Commission was 
granted with the power of exempting financial instruments issued by third-country governments with 
regulatory arrangements at least equivalent to those applied in the Union having zero percent risk weights 
and financial instruments issued by regional governments of the Member States having zero percent risk 
weights.127 Other sovereign debt instruments may have been included - upon conforming to certain criteria 
- in the scope of the exemptions. 
Trading activities which are to be separated from core banking activities in the proposed regulation were 
defined negatively in terms of what they are not rather than in terms of what they are.128 The following 
activities were not considered as trading activities: 
1. Taking deposits;  
2. Lending;  
3. Financial leasing; 
4. Payment services; including issuing and administering means of payment such as travelers’ 
cheques and bankers’ drafts 
5. Money broking, safekeeping, and administration of securities; 
6. Credit reference services;  
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7. Safe custody services,  
8. Issuing electronic money.129 
The proposal clearly classified market making activities as trading activity.130 However, this was amended 
in further rounds of revision of the proposal and market making activities were excluded from the definition 
of trading activities. 
The trading entity was prohibited from taking deposits eligible under the Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
(DGS) except where the deposit related to the exchange of collateral which is related to trading activities. 
The trading entity was also prohibited from providing payment services except where the payment is 
ancillary and strictly necessary for the exchange of collateral which is related to trading activities.131 
However, where a competent authority deems that there is a threat to the financial stability of the core credit 
institution of the Union financial system as a whole, it may decide to prohibit the core credit institution 
from carrying out such trading activities.132 A credit institution, which is banned from carrying out trading 
activities, may carry out such trading activities to the extent that the purpose of carrying out of such 
activities is limited to only prudently managing its capital, liquidity, and funding,133 or to hedging 
purposes.134 
Rules on separate group entities 
In order to deal with perverse interconnections, address the contagion channels and restrict the cross-
subsidization, the proposal also restricts the intra and extra group exposures of credit institutions. 
Limitations on intragroup exposures135 require that the transactions with the members of the group should 
be on arm’s length.136 The arm’s length requirement on the transactions between the core credit institution 
and the trading entity requires that all such transactions be “as favorable to the core credit institution as are 
comparable” transactions involving entities not belonging to the same sub-group.137 The proposal prohibits 
the core credit institution to incur an intra-group exposure exceeding 25% of the core credit institution’s 
eligible capital to an entity that does not belong to the same sub-group as the core credit institution does. 
This limit applies on a sub-consolidated basis.138 In calculating the intragroup large exposure limit, all 
entities belonging to the same subgroup are considered as one client or one group of connected clients.139 
Regarding extra-group large exposure limits, in addition to the restrictions imposed by the Capital 
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Requirements Regulation (CRR),140 the core credit institution falling under the ambit of this chapter, should 
not incur an exposure in excess of 25% of the core credit institution’s eligible capital to a financial entity, 
and exposures that in total exceed 200% of the core credit institution’s eligible capital to financial entities. 
This limit will also apply on an individual and sub-consolidated basis.141 
The EU parent should ensure that a group that contains both a core credit institution and trading entities 
should be structured in a way that on a sub-consolidated basis two distinct sub-groups are created, only one 
of which contains core credit institutions. In other words, under the EU proposal, two separate sub-groups 
should be created within the banking group, one for core banking activities, and one for trading activities.142 
The EU parent should ensure that in the event of insolvency of the trading entity, the core credit institution 
can continue its activities.143 
When a competent authority has prohibited a core credit institution from carrying out certain trading 
activities and if the core credit institution is part of a group, the trading activities can be carried out only by 
a group entity (i.e., a trading entity) that is “legally, economically an operationally separate” from the core 
credit institution.144 The trading entity should not hold any capital instruments or voting rights in the 
depository institution.145 In other words, the trading entity cannot be an affiliate of the depository 
institution.146 
Although the core credit institution is prohibited from holding capital instruments or voting rights in a 
trading entity,147 if holding such instruments or voting rights is indispensable for the functioning of the 
group, the core credit institutions is allowed to hold such instruments or voting rights provided that it has 
taken sufficient measures to mitigate the relevant risks appropriately.148 However, “[a] core credit institution 
… shall not, in any case, be allowed to directly hold capital instruments or voting rights in any trading 
entity.”149 There are also some limitations on the issuance of debt by such entities. The core credit institution 
and the trading entities are required to issue their own debt on an individual or sub-consolidated basis.150 
The management structures of the two entities should be independent of each other151 and the two entities 
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cannot use the same name. Furthermore, their names should be easily distinguishable.152 The proposal also 
contains certain provisions regarding the management of the core credit institution and the trading entity. 
It requires that a majority of the members of the management body of the core credit institution and of the 
trading entity should not consist of persons who are members of the management body of the other entity. 
Aside from the risk management officer of the parent undertaking, no manager of the other entity should 
perform an executive function in both entities.153 In addition, the name or the designation of the trading 
entity and the core credit institution should be such that the public can easily identify which entity is a 
trading entity and which entity is the core credit institution.154 
Within the context of the EU proposal, the universal banking models dominant in Europe for centuries will 
continue. However, no longer would universal banks be able to undertake a wide variety of financial 
activities in a single legal entity. Universal banks should form a holding company structure with separately 
capitalized subsidiaries; one conducting banking and the other trading activities. This structure (mixing 
trading and deposit-taking within a group structure) was proposed to avert the potential unintended 
consequence in the form of regulatory arbitrage by banking and migration of activities to unregulated 
sectors of the financial system.155 It is expected that using the same structure for the banking and trading 
activities would ensure that the activities will remain subject to the oversight and regulatory requirements 
on a consolidated basis. 
The UK: Ring-fencing of core activities 
The UK’s Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 is the implementation of the recommendations 
of the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) chaired by Sir John Vickers. The ICB was set up in 2010 
to study and make recommendations on strengthening the UK banking sector and improving competition. 
The results of the study were published in the Vickers’ report,156 whose findings helped shaped the current 
structural reforms in the UK known as ring-fencing measures.157 Two key structural banking measures in 
the UK include ring-fencing of core banking activities and the treatment of branches of non-European 
Economic Area (EEA) banks.158 
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The Banking Reform Act requires a UK banking entity’s retail deposits, overdrafts, and associated payment 
services to be separated and placed in a subsidiary (a ‘ring-fenced body’). Under this Act, the deposits can 
only be accepted by ring-fenced bodies.159 These entities are barred from engaging in ‘excluded activities’ 
such as dealing in investments as a principal160 and commodities trading. Therefore, ring-fenced bodies 
cannot assume exposures to relevant financial institutions outside of their corporate group. The objective is 
to ensure the continuity of the core banking functions.  
Drawing lessons from the difficulties faced by the Volcker Rule’s distinction between proprietary trading 
and hedging activities,161 the Vickers’ Commission proposed a very narrow definition of the spectrum of 
activities permitted to the ring-fenced entity.162 Therefore, a key difference between the UK and other 
jurisdictions is that the UK ring-fencing approach does not distinguish between proprietary trading and 
other types of trading such as market making. Both of these activities are excluded from the entities that 
conduct the core banking business. Indeed, the ring-fencing approach adopted by the UK turns the structural 
measures’ focus from risky activities toward the deposits and core banking activities.  
There are also certain limitations on the scope of the ring-fencing in the UK. The ring-fencing requirement 
only applies to UK incorporated entities with ‘core deposits’ only if their corporate group holds more than 
£25bn of core deposits in aggregate. The UK subsidiaries of non-UK banks will also fall within the scope 
of ring-fencing provisions if they cross the above-mentioned threshold. However, the non-UK subsidiaries 
of UK banks will not fall within the scope of ring-fencing. Ring-fencing will not apply to the foreign banks’ 
UK branches either. 
The UK ring-fencing measures163 are broader in scope. But they have a more nuanced approach towards 
strictness.164 The prohibitions are broader in the sense that they exclude a broader set of banking business 
from the core banking activities. The excluded activities include securities underwriting and secondary 
market purchases of loans and other financial instruments. A narrow set of retail banking activities fall 
within the ring-fenced activities such as retail deposit-taking, overdrafts to individuals, and loans to small 
and mid-sized enterprises (SMEs). Another set of activities of this type can be conducted within the ring-
fence (some other forms of retail and corporate banking which include services to hedge risks). Ring-fenced 
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activities can be comingled with other activities in separate subsidiaries within the same group, however, 
they are subject to intragroup restrictions (on the size and linkages) that are stricter.  
A set of restrictions are also introduced to restrict the extent to which the banking entities within the ring-
fence can engage in business with other financial sector firms. Indeed, the UK’s ring-fencing approach 
involves both intra-group and inter-firm restrictions (the ring fence). The ring-fenced bodies should not 
have any exposure to each other. In other words, the ring-fenced entities should not be a shareholder of 
other entities, therefore they may be prohibited from becoming a parent company of other entities.165 The 
arms’-length requirement is applied to the contracts concluded with other members of the group.166 
The UK approach also requires that the ring-fenced bodies should be legally, financially and operationally 
independent of the rest of their corporate group.167 According to this Act, the ring-fenced body should be a 
legally separate entity and at least half of its board members should be composed of directors who are 
independent of the rest of the group. The ring-fenced body should also meet capital and liquidity 
requirements, which will be higher than other entities, on a standalone basis. The UK ring-fencing measures 
do not prohibit ring-fenced bodies to be structured as part of a group engaging in excluded activities,168 
however, they should be independent of the group. The ring-fenced body should be enabled to make a 
decision independently of other group members and should not be dependent on their resources.169 The 
ring-fenced body should also be capable of carrying out its own activities should one of the other members 
becomes insolvent.170 Higher capital requirements may apply to ring-fenced bodies. Ring-fenced bodies 
may be asked to issue specific amounts of debt that can be used to boost the loss-absorbing capacity of the 
ring-fenced entity.171 In the event of insolvency of the ring-fenced entity, the depositors will enjoy 
preferential treatment.172 The Treasury is allowed to exempt the bank from ring-fencing rules if such an 
exemption would have no significant adverse effect on the financial system’s function in providing core 
banking services (de minims exception).173 
In July 2014, secondary legislation was enacted which provides more details on the Banking Reform Act. 
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Detailing the banks that will fall within the ambit of the ring-fencing requirements, activities to be ring-
fenced and exemptions.174 Banks must be compliant with those rules by 2019.175 
Unlike the Volcker Rule’s approach that only prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading and 
investment in private funds, the limitations in the UK on the ring-fenced activities are broader and more 
intrusive and covers wholesale and investment banking activities. Unlike drawing the fence around the 
risky activities à la French and German laws, as will be studied in the next section, the UK approach ring-
fences the deposits. The UK regimes will eventually force the banking groups to be broken up into retail 
and wholesale or investment banking entities.176 
France and Germany 
The banking structural reforms were also introduced in France177 and Germany178 in 2013. Both measures 
are similar to the EU proposal.179 These measures entered into force starting from 1 July 2015.180 The 
rationale for introducing banking structural reforms in Germany and France is similar to that of the US, UK 
and EU, i.e., enhancing financial stability through protecting the deposits and retail banking activities 
against the risks originating from trading activities, addressing conflicts of interest, and encouraging lending 
to the real economy.181 The main aim of both of these regulatory changes is to limit the proprietary trading 
and investment and sponsorship of hedge funds and other leveraged investment funds by deposit-taking 
institutions. French and German approach has also a limited scope compared to the Volcker Rule. Similar 
to the EU approach, these reforms are only applicable to SIFIs. Different thresholds are used in the definition 
of a SIFI. 
Both Germany and France limit proprietary trading and investment in hedge funds and other leveraged 
investment funds by deposit-taking institutions. However, unlike the US, Germany & France do not 
completely prohibit these activities. Indeed, in these two jurisdictions, banks are offered two options of 
either stopping these activities altogether or conducting them through a subsidiary, which is a separate legal 
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entity solely dedicated to risky activities. In other words, a deposit-taking institution exceeding certain 
thresholds should either cease to engage in certain trading activities (i.e., proprietary trading and certain 
relations with hedge funds) or transfer them to an entity which is economically, operationally and legally 
separated from the deposit-taking entity.182 Market making is allowed to be carried out within the entity 
which takes on the core banking functions. However, if market-making activities threaten the solvency of 
the deposit-taking institution or one of its affiliates, other than the trading entity, the competent authority - 
as a backstop measure - can demand the separation of market-making activities. Therefore, the German and 
French models still adhere to the universal banking model. 
The difference between French and German regimes, as opposed to the US regime, is that the proprietary 
trading and investments in private funds are not prohibited altogether. Instead, the banks are provided with 
the option of not undertaking these activities or to undertake them through a subsidiary. Despite the 
similarities of German and French approach with the EU proposal, there are a few points at which the 
German and French measures diverge. First, the most salient difference between the French and German 
approach is in the attempt to delineate the activities allowed for a deposit-taking institution and its 
relationships with the trading subsidiary. There are differences in the scope of activities that are prohibited 
for the deposit-taking institutions as well as the relationships between deposit-taking institutions and their 
subsidiaries. As an example, French measures prohibit the subsidiary from engaging in certain activities 
altogether, i.e., high-frequency trading and derivatives transactions with agricultural commodities as an 
underlying asset.183 German measures, however, imposes no such restrictions. In addition, French measures 
allow deposit-taking institutions to transact with hedge funds and other leveraged investment funds if 
sufficiently secured, whereas such transactions are not allowed in Germany.184 
Secondly, the rules on the relationship of the different entities of the group diverge to a certain extent; 
especially, regarding the independence of the subsidiary vis-à-vis the rest of the group. In France, the 
subsidiary is a separate legal entity which is solely dedicated to undertaking risky activities. It is prohibited 
from taking deposits or offering payment services.185 Separate capital requirements apply to them 
individually.186 Therefore, banking groups will be split into deposit-taking and trading entities. It is only the 
trading entity that can be the subsidiary and not vice versa. In France the commercial name of the subsidiary 
must be distinct from the name of the parent company,187 this is to limit the bailout prospect of a subsidiary 
due to reputational impact. French measures also require that the directors of the parent and subsidiary 
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should be different,188  whereas there are no such requirements in Germany, where the subsidiary is only 
subject to the arm’s length requirement.189 The arm’s length requirement in Germany implies that 
restrictions on large exposures190 will apply to such transactions. In contrast, there is no such requirement 
in France. In other words, in France, although restrictions on large exposures apply to the transactions 
between banks and their subsidiaries, the arm’s length requirement is not applicable.191 
Given these differences, it does not seem to be correct to call the German and French approach as 
identical.192 Although the EU proposal basically prohibits the banking entity from engaging in proprietary 
trading and investment in AIFs, other subsidiaries within the same banking group are allowed to engage in 
these activities. The difference between the German and French approach with that of the EU approach is 
that German and French approach allows market making by depository institutions without requiring any 
subsidiarization for that activity,193 However, as mentioned earlier, the EU proposal further amended to 
include market making activities. 
One of the interesting aspects that the proposal tries to address is the relationship between the existing 
regulatory reforms (UK, France, and Germany) on banking structures and the EU proposal. The logic of 
proposing a regulation was that this piece of legislation would normally supersede the previous member 
state level measures. However, the proposal had a grandfathering clause allowing the laws adopted prior to 
the publication of the EU proposal (January 29, 2014) to continue to apply, provided that certain criteria 
were met.194 A close look at those criteria suggests that those conditions would have allowed the UK to 
adhere to its legislation. However, the French and German approaches may not have fulfilled those 
criteria.195 
Discussion: A cross-jurisdictional comparison 
The differences between the proposals on banking structural reforms, i.e., where to set boundaries and how 
to define core banking business or trading entities and how thick the wall between those activities should 
be, originate from the prevailing banking business models and organizations in each jurisdiction and how 
                                                     
188 Art. 511-48-I para. 8 Code monétaire et financier (French Financial Services Act). 
189 § 25f(3) Kreditwesengesetz – KWG (German Banking Act). 
190 See Art. 387 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 
191 Matthias Lehmann, "Volcker Rule, Ring-Fencing or Separation of Bank Activities-Comparison of Structural Reform Acts 
around the World."; José Viñals et al., Creating a Safer Financial System: Will the Volcker, Vickers, and Liikanen Structural 
Measures Help?, 14-16. 
192 Matthias Lehmann, "Volcker Rule, Ring-Fencing or Separation of Bank Activities-Comparison of Structural Reform Acts 
around the World," 8-10. 
193 José Viñals et al., Creating a Safer Financial System: Will the Volcker, Vickers, and Liikanen Structural Measures Help?, 14-
16. 
194 Art. 21 COM(2014), 43 final. 
195 Matthias Lehmann, "Volcker Rule, Ring-Fencing or Separation of Bank Activities-Comparison of Structural Reform Acts 
around the World," 14. 
32 
 
deeply they were affected by the GFC.196 Accordingly, the differences between national proposals within 
the EU spans from institutional and geographic features to the differences in the nature and scope of the 
separation in the banking sector.  
As mentioned before, banking structural reforms have taken divergent paths especially in terms of scope 
and strictness. The starting point for the proposals in the US, UK, EU, France, and Germany is defining and 
delineating the core business of banking functions and the nature of the boundary that should be set between 
those core and non-core functions in the banking business. In terms of scope, the structural measures often 
differ on where the separation line is to be drawn. In other words, there is a considerable difference in the 
scope of the activities that should be separated from the core banking functions. Second, in terms of 
strictness, there is a considerable divergence in how strict or how thick and tall the wall standing in between 
separated activities should be. For example, in the UK, deposit-taking, and provision of overdraft services 
to individual and Small and Mid-sized Enterprises (SMEs) fall inside the ring fence. 
Generally speaking, the Volcker Rule is narrower in scope, but stricter.197 It only puts an outright prohibition 
on proprietary trading, which is a reflection of the view that the nature of core banking business is 
fundamentally different from the activities that are prohibited in terms of riskiness and complexity.198 In 
contrast, the Volcker Rule allows market making, risk-mitigating hedging, underwriting, and similar 
activities on behalf of customers to be undertaken by the banking entities. Significant among its exemptions 
are transactions in specific instruments such as government securities.199 In addition, the Volcker Rule 
prohibits a depository institution from investing and sponsoring entities that could expose banking entities 
to risks similar to those of proprietary trading. These prohibitions include investment in and sponsoring 
private funds (e.g., hedge funds and private equity funds). 
Compared to the Volcker Rule, the EU proposal is broader in scope, but it is less strict than the Volcker 
Rule.200 In terms of strictness, unlike the EU proposal on banking structural reforms, the Volcker Rule 
prohibits mixing trading and other core banking activities in different subsidiaries within the same group.201 
The prohibitions of the EU proposal includes both proprietary trading and market-making activities. 
However, it allows trading activities to be mingled with core banking activities within the same group 
subject to subsidiarization. This proposal, however, sets restrictions on the parents and subsidiaries to 
address problems of contagion. It requires each subsidiary to be independently capitalized and to have 
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adequate liquidity. In addition, transactions between separate entities within the same group shall be 
conducted at arm’s length. Unlike the EU proposal, subsidiarization of the proprietary trading and hedge 
and private equity fund activities are not allowed under the Volcker Rule. Therefore, US banks are not 
allowed to engage in prohibited activities even if they are undertaken in a separate subsidiary of the 
depository institution.202 
In addition, one major difference between the EU proposal and the US Volcker Rule is in the approach they 
have taken to the proprietary trading activities. By requiring the market making and proprietary trading to 
be transferred to a separate entity,203 the EU proposal avoids the daunting task of delineating and defining 
the boundaries between the proprietary trading and other forms of permitted activities under the Volcker 
Rule which is one of the main challenges in its implementation phase.204 
In contrast to the UK approach which draws the ring fence around the core banking activities of the banking 
entity, the EU proposal seems to draw the ring fence around the trading entity in a way to ensure that the 
insolvency of the trading entity will not affect the core credit institution.205 Compared to the UK ring-
fencing approach, the scope of the European proposal is narrower. The focus of the UK ring-fencing is on 
the deposit-taking activities and it is to ring-fence such activities by forcing them to be conducted within a 
separately capitalized subsidiary. However, EU proposal focuses on the proprietary trading, carves out the 
proprietary trading and all assets, liabilities and derivatives positions involved in the process of market 
making and separates them from other banking activities and requires subsidiarization of the proprietary 
trading activities which should be undertaken separately from the deposit-taking institution on a standalone 
basis. The separate trading entity can have exposures to hedge funds, special investment vehicles, and 
private equity investment but not to the deposit-taking institution. However, the trading entity is not allowed 
to provide retail financial services and is prohibited from funding itself with deposits. 
The UK ring-fencing regulation only applies to domestic retail banking and the EU proposal will apply 
only to the largest EU banks. Within the EU proposal framework, activities such as lending to individuals 
and businesses, mortgage lending, wealth management, deposit-taking would be conducted within the same 
group. Therefore, this approach to structural reforms is less restrictive than the UK ring-fencing approach 
in terms of the scope of the activities that a domestic depository institution is allowed to undertake.206  
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Economic costs and potential unintended consequences 
It is suggested that the financial crisis has proven that the welfare gains from mixing commercial and 
investment banking have not been materialized due to three main reasons. The severe agency problems 
within TBTF banks, homogenization originating from rational herding and capital requirements, and 
cultural shifts.207 If true, it seems that structural reforms can play a role in improving all these three aspects. 
However, on the downside, structural reforms are expected to negatively affect financial markets at least in 
two ways. First, they may reduce liquidity.208 Second, they may increase the cost of doing banking or 
decrease banking profitability. Other potential alleged negative impacts of the banking structural reforms 
include negative impact on the efficiency of cross-border groups, additional complications for the crisis 
management and resolvability of cross-border groups, negative impact on the liquidity of the cross-border 
groups and increased likelihood of regulatory arbitrage and shifting some banking activities to the shadow 
banking system.209 Overall, most of the above-mentioned costs can be put into two main categories. The 
costs arising from the impact of structural reforms on economies of scope and diversification and the costs 
arising from the impact on the banking business models and profitability. 
Impact on economies of scope and diversification  
Combining commercial banking, securities and insurance activities within one entity presents several 
advantages.210 These advantages include taking advantage of economies of scale and scope in collecting 
and processing information, risk diversification, and more stable source of income stemming from a 
diversified range of activities. Therefore, such a combination of activities would contribute to banking 
stability and building long-term reputational capital with clients that can enhance the franchise value of 
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banks and create incentives for them to behave more prudently.211 
The most outstanding benefits of combining lending with underwriting and other non-core banking 
activities are the informational advantages and economies of scope. Universal banking can benefit from 
economies of scope through either informational or cross-selling venues.  
Informational venues 
A bank acquires information dealing with its customers in the course of its core banking activities, which 
can be used in its investment banking or trading activities. This can give rise to significant synergies and 
informational efficiencies. However, as mentioned earlier, this situation can be fraught with conflicts of 
interest. If conflicts of interest are dealt with effectively, a huge source of informational efficiencies might 
lie in the synergies arising from combining investment banking and commercial banking within a single 
entity.  
The existence of economies of scope suggests that if there is a fixed cost in lending and underwriting 
securities in the same firm, the combination of these two functions lowers the information production costs 
because it prevents duplication of information production (fixed costs).212 For example, building a banking 
relationship entails costs in terms of evaluation of a firm’s creditworthiness by the commercial bank. 
Subsequent to such evaluation, if the same commercial bank wants to underwrite security issues for the 
same firm, it does not need to incur additional costs in investing in investigating the worth of the firm. 
While if the same underwriting is undertaken by an investment firm, it should incur costs to evaluate the 
firm. The process can also work in the opposite direction, i.e., the information generated in the process of 
underwriting can be used in the extension of the loan to the same firm.213 
Economics of scope and cross-selling 
The revenue economies of scope accrue when the overall cost (including search, monitoring, and 
contracting costs) of purchase of multiple financial services to the buyer from a single seller is lower than 
the cost of purchasing them from different sellers. The sources of economies of scope can be sharing 
common facilities, personnel, knowledge and brand name.214 For example, diversified financial 
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intermediaries have more contact points with clients which facilitate cross-selling, e.g., in addition to 
current accounts, universal banks can offer customers investment account, trading accounts, pension 
schemes, and insurance services. This can increase efficiency in terms of the efforts needed by the retail 
customers to be put on shopping for these products in different places. However, there would be cost to 
economies of scope. Revenue diseconomies of scope would originate from the management complexities, 
and conflicts of interest as the scope of activities broaden.215 The evidence on economies of scale suggests 
that an increase in the scale of 100% (doubling the size) would not reduce average cost more than 5%, and 
estimates of average cost savings in banking through economies of scope is inconclusive.216  
The empirical evidence suggests that during 1988-1992 in countries where the functional separation is 
required, large banks have had an average operational inefficiency scone or 27.5%, however, this number 
stood at 15% in countries where the universal banking was allowed.217 Other studies,218 distinguishing 
between specialized banks, universal banks and financial conglomerates, found that during 1995-1996, the 
average operational efficiency of specialized banks is virtually equivalent to that of the conglomerates in 
traditional intermediation activities. However, in non-traditional activities, conglomerates operate more 
efficiently. On average, he finds that the operational efficiency in universal banks is higher than in 
specialized banks.219 
Impact on banking business models and banking stability  
The specific features of banking entities, such as the scope of their activities and sources of funding, can be 
the determinants of their resilience in the face of financial distress. The question is that which business 
models render banks more resilient in distressed situations and which models make them prone to risks. 
Higher levels of diversification that could be derived from multiple products, client segments, and 
geographic sectors may be associated with more stable and valuable financial institutions. As the correlation 
among different sources of a bank’s cash flow decreases, the benefits of diversification increases. This 
would further lead to better credit quality for banks. In turn, better financial standing leads to lower 
regulatory capital requirements and potential higher profitability. Diversity in financial sector implies the 
coexistence of different institutional forms, business models, and earning models and that they would be 
sufficiently strong so that it would give rise to effective competition among those models. Therefore, 
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diversification may also lead to better earning stability if the diverse activities generate income streams that 
are not perfectly correlated with the existing income stream of the bank. This combination will reduce 
unsystematic risks and will lead to a less volatile income stream.220 On the contrary, it is more likely that 
similar institutions may face difficulties at the same time that could lead to the problem of too-many-to-
fail,221 which makes some financial institutions systemic as a group. These arguments would rally against 
the breaking up the banking entities. 222  
Historical evidence also bears witness to the positive impact of diversification on banking stability. For 
example, between 1921 and 1930, the rate of failure among the small banks in agricultural regions in the 
US was approximately 50%.223 In addition, the rate of profitability of small banks has been smaller than 
that of larger banks between 1926 and 1930.224 According to more recent findings, commercial banks 
involved in securities underwriting are not riskier than the commercial banks that are not involved in such 
activities. Not only are not such commercial banks riskier, but also they are less likely to fail than 
commercial banks who are not involved in such operations.225  
However, over the last decades, the similarity between financial institutions has increased. This trend has 
been more prevalent among large financial institutions.226 This similarity manifested itself in the same 
market (globally), similar activities, similar risk management techniques and similar trading strategies 
which can amplify the effects of systemic risks. The sources of funding in the banking sector have also 
converged and effectively the banking sector has increasingly relied on the same sources of funding. 
Another source of homogeneity in the banking industry comes from interlinkages among institutions. The 
lack of diversity may present risks in the banking sector. Banking structural reforms may indeed decrease 
diversification in the business model in banking and could lead to banking instability. However, more recent 
evidence suggests that the benefits of diversification in terms of return on equity accrue, to a certain degree, 
from product diversification at the expense of higher volatility of bank profitability for more diversified 
banks.227 Therefore, evidence on the economies of scope and diversification on banking stability remains 
inconclusive at best. 
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In addition, it is demonstrated that weakly capitalized, larger banks with greater reliance on short-term 
funding have often had higher risk exposures. On the contrary, banks reliant on strong deposit base and 
greater diversified income are considered as less risky.228 Reliance on short-term wholesale funding resulted 
in the increased financial fragility,229 and bank which had more stable funding continued to lend more 
compared with other banks during the financial crisis.230 In the same vein, the likelihood of failure among 
banks with less reliance on short-term wholesale funding was lower.231 It is shown that universal banks 
have a greater reliance on short-term wholesale funding, have a higher average size, have greater volatility 
of earnings, and higher levels of market risk compared to other banking models.232 On the other hand, the 
size and scope could not produce the claimed benefits, especially, the benefits of diversification were far 
limited than expected and it was far offset by additional complexity.233  
Moreover, trading risks are viewed as an indicator of the risk of financial distress. An IMF study suggests 
that the US and EU banks with substantially greater trading activities than average (measured by the ratio 
of trading income to revenues) were more likely to need explicit government support than other banks.234 
This report suggests that proprietary trading might only be a part of the problem, and risks could originate 
from losses in other activities such as market making, investment banking and hedging strategies.235 On the 
contrary, it is also demonstrated that retail banking service providers are better in terms of cost efficiency 
and performance measures. In general, the retail-oriented models of banking seem to be safer than others, 
both in terms of a lower likelihood of default and better long-term liquidity measures (net stable funding 
ratio).236 In addition, expansionary strategies of the banking institution to multifunctional banking model 
has been found to increase the systematic risk too.237 
The only conclusion that may be derived from the above discussion is that although it is believed that in 
the absence of “any strong evidence in favor of conglomeration, structural reform is a good way to respond 
to interconnectedness in financial markets”,238 as the evidence is not clear that imposing structural reforms 
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can contribute to financial stability, adequate care must be taken in introducing such measures, in particular 
at the EU level.  
Conclusion 
After reviewing the nature of structural reforms and their specific use-cases in banking regulation, this 
paper has closely investigated the arguments for and against the banking structural reforms and studied the 
structural reforms initiatives in the US, EU, UK, France, and Germany. The paper finds that at the heart of 
all banking structural reforms lie the variations of the age-old separation between commercial and 
investment banking. Therefore, most of the arguments against the universal banking model could - to 
varying degrees - be used for establishing banking structural reforms and limiting the universal banking 
model.  
The paper further investigated the most frequently cited rationales for banking structural reforms such as 
mitigating systemic risk, preventing cross-subsidization and moral hazard, and mitigating the conflicts of 
interests in the universal banking model. A closer look at these rationales reveals that there is no conclusive 
empirical evidence that can support such intuitive insights. Regarding the mitigation of systemic risks, as 
the structural measures would limit diversification in banking business models and contribute to increasing 
homogeneity within the banking industry, it is unlikely that they would enhance financial stability. 
Although it may be argued that structural measures can complement prudential tools, it seems that no 
specific banking business model is more susceptible to a greater risk of failure,239 hence contribution to 
financial stability remains very hypothetical. In addition, there is no clear-cut evidence on the amount of 
net regulatory subsidies for the banking industry to support the argument that the structural reforms would 
close the cross-subsidization of the riskier trading activities by taking advantage of regulatory safety nets. 
As for the conflicts of interest, although it seems that the amalgamation of banking and trading activities 
gives rise to conflicts of interest in theory, the banking history and empirical findings suggest that the 
private-law mechanisms, as well as market discipline, have already been successful in reducing the risks 
arising from conflicts of interest. Above all, it seems that the introduction of structural reforms could have 
been more disruptive to the European banking industry which has always operated within a bank-based 
financial system relying on the universal banking model. 
In the absence of credible and conclusive evidence in favor of structural reforms, the withdrawal of the EU 
banking structural reforms proposal in 2018 seems to be a step in the right direction as it was in line with 
                                                     
Solutions," 301. 
239 José Viñals et al., Creating a Safer Financial System: Will the Volcker, Vickers, and Liikanen Structural Measures Help?, 7. 
40 
 
the do-no-harm principle and has arguably decreased the impact of a single large-scale regulatory error. 
Furthermore, this withdrawal would make room for more experimentations with structural reforms at the 
Member-State level that would allow for alternative solutions to be tested for similar problems. Such 
experimentations are likely to produce more bottom-up legal and regulatory innovations, differentiated and 
customized approaches adapted to local circumstances and the idiosyncratic needs of the banking industry 
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